时间：11月17日（星期四）下午13：00开始

 地点：系南529房间

 报告人：Dr. Shiming Deng, Oracle USA

 报告题目：Contracts for Supply Chain Coordination and Risk Management

 报告摘要：

The focus of this research is on contract design for a supply chain consisting of a buyer and a supplier, each maximizing expected profit subject to a chance constraint on target profit as a reflection of risk aversion. We compare the performance of the supply chain under several commonly-used contracts, and derive the best (truth-telling) contracts, which allow an arbitrary division the system-wide expected profit between the two parties. The best contracts under risk constraints have the property that at most one party will not satisfy her profit target at each demand realization. This property implies that the “least risk sharing" is optimal in this environment, contrary to the usual expectations of “risk sharing".

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